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Abstract - Biometric identifiers refer to unique physical properties or 
behavioral attributes of individuals. Some of the well known 
biometric identifiers are voice, finger prints, retina or iris, facial 
structure etc. In our daily interaction with others directly or 
indirectly, we implicitly use biometrics to know, distinguish and 
trust people. Biometric identifiers represent the concept of “who a 
person ’is” ’by ’gathering ’vital ’characteristics ’that ’don’t ’correspond 
to any other person. The human brain to some extent is able to 
ascertain disparities or variation in certain physical attributes and 
yet verify the authenticity of a person. But this is difficult to be 
implemented in electronic systems due to the intense requirements 
of artificial decision making and hard-coded logic. 
 
This paper examines the possibility of using a combination of 
biometric attributes to overcome common problems in having a 
single biometric scheme for authentication. It also investigates 
possible schemes and features to deal with variations in Biometric 
attributes. The material presented is related to ongoing research by 
the Computer Communications Research group at Leeds 
Metropolitan University. We use this paper as a starting step and as 
a plan for advanced research. It offers ideas and proposition for 
implementing hybrid biometrics in conjunction with cryptography. 
This is a work in progress and is in a very preliminary stage. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, biometrics is used to grant access of some kind, like 
verified and logged entry into buildings. The complication of 
implementing accurate recognition schemes has restricted the use 
of biometrics for financial transactions. In other words, the 
preciseness of the system is dependent on how well the digital 
system is able to match a user’s physical properties under 
varying conditions. In this paper we conduct a brief study of how 
accurate biometric identifiers are, and the suitability in 
implementing them for a robust authentication system. 
 
Depending on the nature of the application, a single biometric 
identifier would often be inadequate to create a significant level 
of security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, this has been stressed in the past with regard to 
the customer base of financial institutions [1]. The reason for this 
is that all customers might not be able to produce a given 
biometric attribute due disabilities or environmental factors. 
 
This major problem could be alleviated by using a collection 
of biometric attributes, rather than a single one. The degree of 
uniqueness and robustness against circumvention [2] makes 
biometrics ideal for applications involving cryptography. We 
will need to devise a mechanism that uses a set of characteristics 
but at the same time ensure that it caters and adapts to different 
conditions. 
 
II. ISSUES IN HYBRID BIOMETRICS 
 
In a real-time scenario, from a set of B biometric attributes, a 
person may not be able to produce a subset of attributes. We will 
need to deal with such situations and clearly define the 
acceptable level of identification. For example, assume an 
application defines B={ Iris, fingerprints, voice, password, face 
}. If on any one particular instance, an authentic person may not 
be able to produce all the attributes of B but rather a subset S={ 
Fingerprints, face, password }.This could be due to change in 
physical attributes of a person, or due to external influential 
factors. Correlating, S with B is a major challenge. Incomplete 
and erroneous input must be distinguished. A genuine person 
might furnish incomplete biometric data. In such cases the 
system must decide if the identification process has sufficient 
information to authenticate a person. This is extremely critical in 
those cases when hybrid biometric data is used for key 
generation that is used with standard crypto-algorithms. 
 
We examine the following issues 
 
• Extracting and representing biometric data that could for 
instance be used for hybrid biometric key generation. 
• Dealing with erroneous and incomplete verification data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although usage of biometric data in cryptosystems is new, 
successful attempts in implementation have been made in the 
recent past. One such system is the BIO-IBS, which is short for 
biometric Identity Based Signature scheme [3]. The system, 
effectively deals with changes to biometric data, which vary over 
time. Davida et. al. [4][5] created a system which uses a 
biometric attribute as a key. Another major research was by F. 
Hao and C.W. Chan [6] who presented a method to generate 
keys from handwritten signatures. 
 
III. EXTRACTING BIOMETRIC DATA 
 
The typical setting of a hybrid biometric authentication system 
will be wide spread and include individual sub-systems to derive 
vital data from some specific user attribute. The sub-systems will 
need a means of representing physical features and further also a 
method to compare with the template. The likely presence of 
noisy data is an extra complexity at each sub-system. The first 
step involved will be to compare variations to detect noisy data. 
 
In the case of a hybrid mechanism, template matching for each 
sub-system is only a part of the overall process. At a higher level 
the representation and template comparison must be used to 
consolidate distributed results. The major template will be the 
key that is defined for the user and has to match the aggregated 
key formation derived during authentication. An intermediate 
comparator key can be generated based on some function 
imposed on independent approximations obtained from various 
sub-systems. The sub-systems may be physically located in a 
single module, but they have well defined unit of task associated 
with a definite attribute. A sub-system could be a device like the 
finger print scanner, iris scanner etc. 
 
The scheme we present basically has four important phases 
(Fig. 1) 
• Providing enrolment information. 
• Compare – Detecting noisy data 
• Approximation – Independent representation of 
 attributes derived from noisy data 
• Consolidate – Creating rigid comparator key from 
 approximation. 
 
It could be noted that the consolidate function is first applied 
per individual at the enrolment process. Subsequently, it is 
applied for every authentication session. Complex consolidate 
functions could also embed extra security transformations to 
resist attacks. For example it could add extra bits to prevent key 
generation from being straight-forward. 
 
Let us first see how biometric data can be represented. In a 
recent publication Dodis et. Al. [7], described different 
mechanisms for representation. Even the BIO-IBS mentioned 
before [3], uses a significant part of that research. 
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Compare (only during authentication session) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Enrolment and hybrid key generation 
 
 
IV. REPRESENTING ATTRIBUTES 
 
The material presented below is based on the research of 
Dodis et Al [7], and we observe how the methodology could be 
used in conjunction with hybrid biometrics. We only briefly 
explain those concepts that are relevant to our research. 
 
As said in the previous section, the representation scheme 
must address the possibility of noisy data. A combination of 
secure-sketch and fuzzy extractors can be used to encompass 
handling representation, biometric matching and to deal with 
noisy data. 
 
Every biometric attribute is assumed to have a metric space 
which is normally infinite. However, to restrict the study to a 
well defined set we could assume the metric space to be finite. 
This will help us to find out the magnitude of difference between 
any two elements of the metric space. Each element is a 
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representation of some Biometric input. Let M be the metric 
space for any one type of Biometric input. 
 
A secure sketch SS can be defined on M. A secure sketch is a 
randomized map. Let us define a secure sketch SS (w), where w 
is some (possibly constant) representation. Using SS(w) and 
some deterministic recovery function Rec it is possible to derive 
w from some w’ close to w. This also takes into account the 
distance between w and w’. In others words it is possible to 
define an acceptable variation level between two values 
belonging to M. The derivation of w will fail if w-w’>vl, where 
vl is the variation allowed. w-w’ is the distance measured either 
based on hamming metric, set difference metric or edit metric. 
Ref. [7] will provide a detailed understanding of these metrics. In 
simple terms, these metrics are used to evaluate the variation in 
the number of bit positions of two given inputs. 
 
A secure sketch can be extended to create fuzzy extractor. A 
fuzzy extractor on a metric space M is defined by two procedures 
Gen (probabilistic generator), Rep (reproduction procedure). 
The generator function accepts an input w and outputs an 
extracted string R and also a public string P. The reproduction 
procedure uses P and any input w’ close to w, to extract R. The 
input w mentioned here is the biometric attribute presented 
during the enrollment process. The generation of R and P is 
dependent on the logic built into the Gen function. 
 
Since the above scheme yields a definitive R for a given input, 
this method could be exploited to generate identifiers for creating 
stored biometric templates. The identifier (or a part of it) could 
then be taken as it is or further processed to form a key. Let us 
perform a run through the enrollment process (step 1 in fig. 1). 
This is the phase where a user registers, by presenting biometric 
data. Our actual scenario includes a multitude of biometric 
attributes, but for the sake of simplicity at this stage, we will 
isolate the case for a single attribute. Let us consider voice. 
When a new user is registering, he will read out a password into 
a microphone. This will be some w belonging to the valid metric 
space M and that can be represented using n bits. The fuzzy 
extractor invokes the Gen function with the input w. Gen(w) will 
produce some R and a public string P. The R that is obtained 
here can be used as a partial template or can be altered based on 
some predefined function. As said before, this can be used as a 
(or a part of) main key (see section 5 on consolidation). We have 
assumed that only one voice sample is collected. Alternatively, a 
series of samples maybe collected and a mean of these samples 
based on variations between each other could be used to 
determine w. 
 
For the attributes representation stage (step 2 in fig. 1), the R 
values of each attribute is considered as the building blocks of 
the main key. For example attribute a1 is represented by R1.  
The consolidate function is executed both during enrolment 
and at every authentication session. The consolidate function 
could be some hashing function. The (one-time) enrolment 
session uses this function to generate the full key. The 
authentication sessions use the function to generate a comparator 
key. An authentication session grants a successful entry if the 
comparator key matches the already stored full key. For this to 
happen, every biometric attribute with possible input ranges 
{w’1, w’2, w’3… , w’n}, all sufficiently close to w, must use the 
recovery function (Rec) and the corresponding public string to 
regenerate R. When the recovery functions yield a successful 
result for each and every biometric attribute, we are sure to have 
a key match. This is because the input to the consolidate function 
during the enrolment and authentication has matched and the 
derived comparator key and the stored key are the same. 
 
While the consolidate function can impose constraints for 
making a key complex, the tolerance level for each biometric 
attribute can be defined at the top most (end-user) level. The 
tolerance levels can be independently set based on the set of 
small variations on the metric space. Let us again recollect the 
condition w-w’<vl. Defining the range of vl determines the 
tolerance level. If vl is from a very small range, the system is 
very precise and more tolerant. A significantly large range of vl 
will make the system more flexible by allowing a larger degree 
of erroneous data. 
 
V. CONSOLIDATION 
 
The consolidation function will involve some function to 
further process the attributes. The function would take as 
parameters, biometric representations for n physical attributes to 
yield a key. During the enrolment process, the consolidation 
yields a template that is permanently stored. The consolidation is 
also executed for every authentication session, and each time it 
outputs a comparator key (cKey). This key could be used for 
encrypting real-time communications, if and only if it exactly 
matches the stored template key (cKey=tkey). 
 
The consolidation function can be custom formulated in any 
appropriate way to offer maximum security by adding 
complexity to the key bit sequence. But in our research, we have 
considered using a concept that is quite similar to hashing [8]. A 
typical hash function will map large domains to smaller ranges 
using many to one function. We know this will have the effect on 
the size of the overall key. So large biometric representations can 
be collected and collated together to be mapped into a fixed 
length key domain. The main criteria we use for our consolidate 
function is that it should be a one way function that performs 
some sequence alterations and/or bit additions to the initial key 
bit sequence. The idea is to generate a key whose bit sequence is 
so large that it can resist any brute force attack. If the initial 
representation of each of the attributes is many bits long, the 
overall summation of various attributes will be resistant to brute-
force attacks even without bit padding. Padding bits is useful, 
when fewer attributes are provided to authenticate and to 
generate fixed length large keys.  
 
The consolidate routine requires an initial bit sequence that is 
obtained from the R representation values of each attribute. Over 
n biometric attributes we will have a set of Ri where I Є {1..n}. 
Each of the Ri might be subject to initial bit padding to attain a 
fixed size sequence. The padding will be in accordance to the 
expectations of the length of the output key. Now we have a 
finite length bit string say S. S will be the input for the one way 
function that will output the key. The string is divided into 
blocks. The function will perform a well-defined set of iterations 
and bit-wise processing on each block of S. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.Consolidate routine 
 
 
At the enrolment session for a user the consolidate routine, 
creates and stores a key in the template database, which is again 
used by the same routine during authentication to compare a 
generated string (cKey) to the stored key (template). 
 
VI. DEALING WITH PARTIAL ATTRIBUTE SUBMISSIONS 
 
Biometrics is subject to inconsistent presentation that depends 
on how the attribute is presented and represented. Often, it would 
not be possible for a valid user to present all attributes accurately 
which results in a major difference to biometric data presented 
during enrolment and some instance of authentication. Take for 
instance, a user is suffering from a cold and there is a large 
variation in the voice sample provided at authentication. If wvoice 
is the voice sample provided during enrolment and w’voice is the 
voice sample provided when the user has a cold, then there could 
be a possibility of wvoice -w’voice  > vlvoice. When this is the case, 
recovering Rvoice using secure sketch would not be possible and 
authentication will fail.  
 
The former method presented creates a template that is stored 
permanently and subsequently used for comparisons. But would 
it be possible to generate keys at run-time based on partial 
attribute submission? The challenge here is to permit access to a 
person and release a suitable key for transactions, based on a fair 
amount of certainty determined by fewer biometric attributes. As 
a part of our research in the lab, we are currently endeavoring to 
implement such a test-schema for a PKI environment. 
Obviously, the key(s) here will not be constant and will vary for 
each session, depending on which attributes and how many 
attributes are presented. We have adopted a very basic approach 
that is elementary at the initial stages of the research. 
 
The system hence uses partial consolidation. This means that 
if n attributes are presented at an authentication session, and if 
only some of the n attributes are known to match, then the 
system ignores erroneous attributes and consolidates only correct 
ones. Therefore, an intermediate comparator key cannot be 
matched to some stored template as it may differ for each 
session. The template key created in this scheme is not used for 
comparison but rather released immediately, if partial matches 
are obtained. 
 
It is assumed that during enrolment a user is able to provide all 
specified biometric attributes. Let us say the enrolment 
procedure demands fingerprints, iris, voice, facial feature and 
password. At enrolment the representations for all these 
attributes are generated. Hence we have representations Rvoice, 
Riris, Rfingerprints, Rfacial and password. These representations are 
utilized to create a key using a one way function. 
 
There are a couple of constraints we need to impose to ensure 
that the system does not compromise on security given that a 
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Biometric attribute representations 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
Combine Attributes 
If padding 
bits needed
Append 
Bits 
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(Template key) 
Output=cKey 
(Comparator key) 
Template Database 
person can gain entry just based on fewer attributes. For instance 
the administrator can fix that at least three out of a five attributes 
are mandatory. He can also attach weights to each of the 
attributes and designate that the summation of the weights of 
correctly produced attributes is greater than some value. Let us 
for example use the following weights 
 
Voice= 7, Iris=4, Facial=10, Fingerprints=3, Password=16 
 
Let the designated summation of weights be 15. Also, let 
number of mandatory attributes is set to 3. Suppose during an 
authentication session, only 3 of the five attributes, voice, iris 
and fingerprints are found to be correct. Although this satisfies 
the number of mandatory attributes, it does not satisfy the 
constraint that the summation of the weights must be greater than 
or equal to 15. Again, if the system is successful in matching 
only voice and password, the authentication will fail, even 
though the summation of weights is greater than 15. A valid 
authentication combination would be voice, iris and password. 
 
Each of the attributes submitted during authentication will be 
checked for Rn – R’n < vln and any attribute violating this 
condition will be discarded. The partial consolidate function will 
accept as parameter the summation of weights and this will 
denote which attributes have had a perfect match. For example, a 
summation value of 29 will mean facial, fingerprints and 
password has been successfully authenticated. The weights 
attached to the attributes are such that the summation 
combinations are unique, which makes it easy to identify the 
matched attributes. Similarly, a value of 17 would mean iris, 
facial and fingerprints alone. A similar weighting scheme for 
multi-modal (hybrid) biometrics has been explained in [9]. 
 
At this juncture, the consolidate function could use a one way 
function to generate a dynamic key just using the attributes 
matched. Alternatively, it could release the stored static key, 
which was created using all n attributes at the time of enrolment. 
The method can be implemented for either key generation or key 
release procedure. When fewer attributes are used, it might 
require padding of bit fields to have a secure length key. This 
will be an extra logic that will decide the amount of padding 
required based on number of attributes matched and the length of 
the desired key. 
 
VII. TESTING FOR EFFICIENCY 
 
A fine method to evaluate the performance of a biometric 
verification system is to present it with large number of enquiries 
for authorized and unauthorized users and measure the similarity 
rating with a stored reference. In our case, the stored reference is  
 
 
Fig 3.Genuine-Imposter Frequency diagram for single biometric authentication 
system 
 
the set of digital representations for multiple biometric attributes 
stored during enrolment. But a match hit is made not based on 
one-to-one basis but on the output of consolidation. In other 
words, no single attribute is alone adequate to produce a match, 
but rather a set of attributes that produce a definitive output when 
presented to a hash-function. 
 
The graph presented above, is from Biometrics FAQ [10], and 
shows the genuine imposter frequency diagram, mainly 
applicable for single-attribute biometric systems. As seen in the 
circled area, the two curves overlap which proves that there is a 
threat of an imposter gaining access. For a best case 
authentication, the two curves should not overlap. In single 
biometric authentication systems, this is not possible. 
 
However, the system that we are investigating and 
endeavoring to implement will try and remove the overlapping 
property of the two curves. Since a perfect hit is based on 
multiple attributes, we believe it is possible and this will be a 
major basis for evaluating our system. If a means can be derived 
to clearly isolate the genuine users from imposters, that factor 
will be a key milestone that hybrid biometrics can achieve. 
 
Another component of the test schema would be subjecting the 
hybrid-biometric system to attacks. Single biometric 
authentication systems can be exposed to attacks such as the hill-
climbing method [11]. It is estimated that adding more attributes 
for authentication and using them in conjunction with hashing 
functions would reduce or possibly remove scope for attacks. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
A schema for using a multitude of human physical attributes 
to create keys for cryptography has been presented. Combining 
biometrics and cryptography is a new and a significant area in 
the scope of advanced communications security. The methods 
presented are still in an early research phase and are currently 
being investigated from a mathematical perspective. At the 
moment we are concentrating on implementation issues whilst 
attempting to reduce the complex overheads in managing a 
multitude of key generation operations using biometrics. The 
methods for handling hybrid biometric data seem straight 
forward but the intricacies of computation to embed 
sophisticated security is extremely compound. A major part of 
our investigation concerns the management of large biometric 
data representations and time complexity of consolidation to 
generate keys, hence governing the overall time requirements per 
authentication session.  
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